

# *Joint Air & Space Power - JAPCC Conference 2008*

## *PANEL 1*

### *"Command, Control and Shared Situational Awareness"*

#### **Lt Gen De Vincenti – ITA A, DCOM Operations Command**

Advances in ICT in last decade led to NEC. I am missing from the “slide 4,” as all briefers are, – the enemy! Self-synchronization is difficult to achieve. Within Air C2 we need the ability to react to support follow-on activities. Legacy C2 needs modern upgrades to give SSA. For Italy, after 4<sup>th</sup> iteration, we are looking to connect service to service, rather than system to system. IT is deeply involved in CWID and Trial Imperial Hammer to integrate assets and systems in near-future NEC architecture. Therefore to train personnel is essential. Cyber threat is a real one and must be guarded very closely. How in NEC do we deal with Cyber-attack?

#### **Air Marshal Walker - GBR A, DCOM CC Air Ramstein**

Is mission command relevant today? Mission Command started in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and was based on large scale, large area warfare of the Prussian Army. They did not have all the toys of today. C2 – Command and Control is not the same and often confusing. SSA for commanders is different from controllers; controllers need short-term requirements, commanders need long-term requirements. Clarity, flexibility and understanding and beliefs, doctrine and training are all crucial to Mission Command. Different attitudes of how to do COIN. Decision Superiority (DS) okay, but actions required. To give orders is 10% of the job – action takes 90%. The biggest limitation in NATO and the biggest strength in NATO is its people. Plans for the future need to take account of who can be the best commander and are they available when necessary. There may be no time available for exercises and training. Highly complex systems will create own problems.

#### **Major General Gijbers - NLD L, ACT DACOS C4I**

Land forces need mission command for agility because they are spread out and deployed. Good understanding of the commander’s intent is necessary at all command levels, a clear understanding of the outcome is desired. How can NEC strengthen this without the long screwdriver? ACT will discuss this theme next year at the NNEC conference. We need synchronization of planning cycles.

#### **Brigadier General Dr. Stimbeanu - ROU A, ADCOS MILITARY COOPERATION DIVISION SHAPE**

New strategic levels in the military organization of the Romanian forces were formed. Huge amount of good IT were procured, but future war needs fused sensors to convert information to the intelligence branch however, decision cycle will be slowed by all of this. A radical change in the way of processing information is required; information must be handled horizontal and vertical. New NATO nations striving to achieve NEC but struggling. How do we share information across all of the Alliance including security, releasability? This is very expensive to achieve, how can the Alliance help?

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### **Q&A**

*Q – Concerning NATO operations, do we have the superiority or the enemy ?*

A - Western world claims superiority. History tells us that is not true. Play within the system, it will be altered, sometimes to the good. Be attentive and adaptable to inputs to get a better output. We do learn from our play. Take a big dose of humility at the start of a campaign.

Statement from the audience - Prussians knew who their enemy were, wearing different uniforms. Now we don't know. Information superiority not decision superiority is the key – we can do it quickly, but is it the right decision?

A – There are differences in command and ROE. How would the Army command if the Army could move men around the battlefield as quickly as Air Force do now? We do practice mission command. The three services use the same words – mission command – but use them differently. Airmen should not imitate Army personnel in the way they do business.

Statement from the audience – We must consider implications of actions alongside the commander's intent, but don't believe air do that as well.

Statement from the Moderator – We also miss the cultural implications of our actions.

Statement from the audience – DS at all levels. Slide 4, as always, look at things unopposed – air superiority is not a right. How do we operate when we don't have air superiority? We must assume that enemy is already inside our networks.

A – Cyberspace – the enemy is already in and we must work with degraded systems. We build networks simple to manage - therefore, easy to kill. We must assume technology will be lost and must train for it.

*Q – Do Airmen need more mission command, because air can cause strategic effects?*

A - How are you going to do it and what is it you are going to do? Do not design the future structure based on one or two individuals.

Statement from the audience - Commander's must make intent and effect known.

A – A lot of time was spent on exercises and practicing information flow to make sure that the intent is provided. We also need air/land/sea integration. We need training and education to overcome a moment of poor decision which destroys a lifetime of history.

A – I do not agree that C2 should be delegated to the lowest level. Getting or keeping air superiority in the future cannot be guaranteed.

Statement from the Moderator – We should be prepared for the next not last war.

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*Q – We must check how we look at mission command. We need action superiority through a COP plus must have the mission command.*

A - Different nations look at mission command differently. We must encourage lower levels to use initiative tailored to the nature of the conflict. Each theatre/conflict is different and needs a different view.

Statement from the audience – Washington Post quote from theatre “If there is the likelihood of one civilian on the ground, we would not bomb, even if Bin Laden was on the spot.”

A - Fire the spokesman!!

*Q - What is the definition of mission command? We need one, probably for each service, theatre or environment. See application of EBAO as a method of synchronizing all activity. Is it the willingness or ability to share for SSA?*

A - SSA happens anyway. The highest levels promote SSA but it is a cultural issue that it does not happen. We use technology as the reason we cannot share – IEGs will help.

A - Horizontal sharing has its dangers as individuals make decisions based on others input.

Statement from the audience – We are rule and rule of law followers and most follow them to good effect using a high moral standard. Therefore we need to make sure that the orders are right.

*Q - Slide 4 depicts Electro magnetic spectrum always assumed in. Where should the EMS SA and control lay happen?*

A - JFACC normally picks up EMS SA, but should he? He does it on behalf of the Joint Command. He can't have a committee doing it, but how? He must adopt the Joint Commander mindset when doing it.

*Q - A security question. Where to and how to balance sharing versus security?*

A - Trust through mutual training. The difficulty is, if you don't do it or ad hoc HQs. NATO needs to get on a common information grid soonest.

*Q - Through CAOCs we are currently centralized execution rather than decentralized. Should we be moving away from ATO cycle through synchronized information to achieve effects? The NEC is to build COP to ease decision making and reducing OODA loop across all domains.*

A - Observe, overreact, destroy, apologise.

Statement from the Moderator – The JAPCC is looking at mission command definitions.