

# *Joint Air & Space Power - JAPCC Conference 2008*

## *PANEL 2*

### *"Battlespace Management (BSM)"*

#### **Vice Admiral Bedet - NLD N, DCOM CC Mar Northwood**

Trends – complexity increase and overlaps, no single environment now – we are and will be Joint and Combined. Thus, why is the ATO cycle defined with 72 hours and tied to a Jt. Planning Model? What about a Joint Planning cycle?

#### **Major General van Loon - NDL L, COS CC-Land, Heidelberg**

Without air in Afghanistan nothing works. What do we mean by battlespace? Who are the enemies? A man in Afghanistan will get \$25 to shoot at you, but is he the enemy? We need to identify enemies. We don't need air support to give freedom of movement, but we need counter IED. Force on force battles are fairly easy, it is the asymmetric battle we are fighting that is a lot harder. Seams between components, MC decided no land component anymore, now we work with Corps, but all are quite different. The vision of C2 in battlespace is different – supporting or supported, even definitions of OPCON differs between US and NATO. We have to train for integration, air/land/sea integration needs priority including information sharing.

Communication superiority, i.e. if you can't explain what you are doing, how can you win a war that is 10% action and 90% communication? We should not just use NEC to do things faster, rather we should use it to make it slower and better.

#### **Air Commodore Bell - GBR A, Director Equipment Capability**

Joint Air Power should include many more non-airmen in the discussion. Airpower is the asymmetric advantage. How do we maximize airpower? The answer is: Bring the air and land HQ in Afghanistan together and not 1000 miles apart. Paranoid with safety – rich averse, not risk aware. Balance of risk. This tends to be an ownership issue. We need to be aware of showing all in the world what we can do against a man on a camel. The challenge for us as airmen is to understand airpower better. CAOC just provides available air, but needs to integrate it better. Tailored effect for what land forces need rather than what land forces want.

#### **Brigadier General Both - DEU A, DCOS Operations, Air Staff**

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Are we actually improving air/land integration (ALI) one year after it was discussed. IT and IT security concerns, but NATO nations are struggling. Tends to be national solutions, must consider its interoperability, need to accredit CIS for sharing. Soft issues like training, mindset, culture, TTPs. How much self-synchronization is needed and feasible? Include NGOs in our thinking. Floating or TST's are tricky to handle. Achievable level of interoperability is to be recognized. The more the empty battlefield the harder the job. Stovepipes must be stopped.

### **Q&A**

Statement from the panel – There must be an automatic response or action from air, when the situation for land forces is very dangerous. However, our soldiers need to have confidence in their own weapons. Otherwise, big weapons which were used all the time, would cause the loss of confidence of the local population who were getting bombed all the time. If an exercise is not Joint, don't waste money on it! Jt. Training Ex., with legacy scenarios, still take precedence over fully integrated Jt. Scenarios based on the battle we are currently fighting.

*Q Underlying assumption that air is reactionary. Can we lead with air to shape battlespace?*

A – Airpower can be used to convince a local leader to be compliant with a kinetic SoF. So the answer is yes -of course, but must be used proactively after proper planning. Use all the effects that air can bring to bear and not just Close Air Support.

A - Yes, information operations should participate. I can't see air being used though, without full integration.

Statement from the Moderator – If Joint effect is required then the Joint Planning sequence must take place.

*Q – May I ask for the panel title to go up? Situational awareness at operational level is non-existent so air power is pushed to tactical level and not used properly.*

A – We are not doing very well in Afghanistan. SOF is used to take out the IED layers/makers, and not into the press. Nobody is able to understand a 12<sup>th</sup> Century Muslim society, therefore I

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can't put a McDonalds restaurant on every corner and give women the right to vote and expect all to be solved.

*Q – Does the current focus on ALI reflect a failure to conduct joint operations in the first place? If we assume that we can produce a Joint Operational Picture and push it down to the correct level, how will that change the way we do business?*

A - No magic answer using technology. Have to think out-of-the-box and be integrated?

A- The success of ALI has waxed and waned. Inter-service rivalry for funding is still rife and this culture is difficult to overcome.

A – Comprehensive approach is the key to Afghanistan and not just dropping bombs. Stabilisation operations and ALI are important. Common Operational Picture and what about common relevant operational picture? The ability to make sure that intent – military and political – is understood at the tactical level.

A – Yes, and we all have different ideas of what a COP is! SACT must take a lead on this and must know exactly what it is that we want.

*Q – ALI is a two way street and land must try to understand air's capabilities. Is there a deficit in air/maritime integration?*

A – Yes, there is. But, we have been working on it. There is no doctrine and we have to do something about it. We need experienced people keeping and building on knowledge with constant engagement.

*Q – Two comments are made about IT computers, battlespace management is broader than air, land and sea, we need the space piece and cyber as well. How envisage them being integrated?*

A – Firmly, I believe that Europeans need to commit themselves to Space.

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*Q – Joint integration can give us a solution in some years time, but we have to ask the right questions. But what are the right questions? There is a need to change planning between intelligence, operations and planning. We should look forward in the fight, but what do they need in five years? We will win if Afghan children are dreaming of becoming teachers, but not if they are thinking of becoming mujahedeen.*

A – We need 70% solutions now and don't care what we can get in three years time! Absolutely right is the point that the Afghan success is children who dream of being teachers rather than dreaming of being Taliban. We request equipment that interacts within the internet.

A – The golden thread in interoperability, is NATO not good enough at it? Interoperability is constantly a headline, but we are doing well. What we need is to know the direction we should go in, therefore we need to know SACT's direction.