

# *Joint Air & Space Power - JAPCC Conference 2008*

## *PANEL 4*

### *"Gaining Intelligence and Information Superiority"*

#### **Brigadier General Feehan - USA A, Vice Cdr Electronic Systems Center**

This panel will address the how for intelligence capabilities.

There are 3 areas that need to be discussed. There is a definite need for systems career field.

Need to provide the full spectrum to the users for what they need. We have to let a network be self forming. We have to come up with systems like Objective Gateway. We have the technical end of the spectrum. We have been asked to integrate legacy national systems such as MAJIC.

A warfighter needs to get the intelligence that is pertinent to their situation, removing the extraneous information and data streams. The reality check; this is difficult...there are dozens of systems involved in each legacy system.

The biggest risk is security. Perhaps we are setting up the holy grail for the adversary where if you break into one system, you break into all. Be wary of the contractor, the specs for these systems may not give you the capabilities you really asked for. "Don't be the data hog."

We need to adapt the idea of strategic pauses along the way. We have to use the "bus stop" approach.

We, as senior leaders, need to evaluate our commanders intent and rules of engagement when trying to get these capabilities to the warfighter. Those at the pointy end of the spear must be allowed to do their job.

#### **Air Commodore Fradgley - GBR A, Director EAG**

If we look at the amount of information that is out there, it is a sobering experience. There's more info today on a daily basis than we are capable of dealing with. If you add UAV element, there is a huge dearth of exploitation to deal with. We have insufficient emphasis on exploitation. It is a very demanding task to deal with all of this information; there has to be a central server, backup systems. We're talking about billions of terabytes. In reality, we have a problem with protocols. We don't want to duplicate, but won't know we are duplicating until it is too late. The releasability of information is the one of the biggest challenges facing NATO.

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We need to focus our effort on existing resources; priorities at national levels will differ. Our focus is changing because the world is changing. Exploitation is the key and we need to prioritize carefully.

### **Ms Rossini - NC3A, Leader IPT 11 Joint ISR & Sensors**

There is a lot that technology has already solved. I have been involved with the MAJIIC program, bringing 9 nations together improving interoperability. Bold Avenger was an example of Time Sensitive Targeting where nations came together. NATO used MAJIIC construct in NNEC exercise in Sweden and this demonstrates cooperation amongst non-NATO nations and NATO partner nations. MAJEX - 70 military officers, 40 technicians (industry), and 30 different ISR systems (many in ISAF today) – focus of exercise was dissemination of full motion video. We have to start looking at hard issues such as releasability. Many NATO nations have asked to plug into the NATO construct. Relies on the release of data, nothing in, nothing out. This depends on the willingness to share, not the ability to share. We should focus on what is possible, we can't afford to throw away information. There is commercial capability to sort through this information.

### **Wing Commander Stewart- - DCOM Intelligence Fusion Centre**

I will cover NATO intel as it exists now; Intel culture; Intel Fusion Center (IFC). NATO and the PE review. NATO Intel Fusion Center is not a NATO PE organization. It is an MOU organization with US supervision. We have 22 NATO nations present in the IFC. Culturally, they accept intelligence individuals (162 posts). Only 4 NATO organizations have a cradle to grave intelligence construct (US, UK, Canada and Turkey). Their top priority is to support ISAF, then KFOR, etc... Their major feed comes from the US for the GeoINT side. The ability on imaging systems is looking good. SIGINT systems have a way to go. We could do with more feeds from more countries. All source and open source, many feeds coming in. The personnel at the IFC have the training and capability to produce 24 hour intel with releasability from 22 NATO nations. We have a good working NATO intel system called BICES. We are changing the culture from need to know to responsibility to share. Challenges for the future: Bandwidth, enough people with the training and knowledge, changing the culture to responsibility to share. The INT culture is changing.

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### **Q&A**

*Q – There is a huge amount of information. How are we going to use this information to our advantage? What are we going to do for quality control? Information can be manipulated to promote one's own interests. Are we using quality control to ensure the information we receive is correct?*

A – That is a fundamental problem. Firstly, we do not rely on single source intelligence, we rely on fused intelligence from multiple sources. Secondly, we use training to ensure a high quality of information.

A - The biggest question is about risk. The more experienced the analysts, the more they will know and the less they will be confused by the data. You have to put the raw data out there, to balance risks with opportunity.

*Q – NATO has too much deployed experience in the J2 branches, therefore I am happy to see the situation at JAC Molesworth. But there is a manning barrier at NATO for intelligence analysts, how do we overcome this?*

A - Nations have to feel that they are getting benefit back from putting their people into these posts. This is up to our senior leaders. It's growing more intelligence people from the NATO countries so that there is a bigger pool to pull from.

A - From the US perspective, we are getting top intelligence people promoted. By promoting these officers, we now have key personalities on Joint Staffs, and there are now key opportunities in the staff for intelligence positions. Other NATO nations can look at this model.

A - There are limitations on the availability of resources, which is linked to retention in most militaries. It is very difficult to address.

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Statement from the audience – There is a US discussion ongoing. You have to force the system. If you don't have twenty years to grow intelligence personnel to flag rank, you have to force the system. We need to make sure that we don't have intelligence guys keeping secrets, they must have the operator's perspective.

*Q - We must agree what the problems are in order to solve them. There is enough technology out there allowing us to share this information. How can we use this?*

A - There are technologies out there, but it is difficult to share information. We've been chasing the wrong contractors; we have to go to experts in the intelligence systems, and not to the experts in the actual systems, handling search engines, Facebook, Google, etc. We need to be careful with the technology developed by the engineers, especially the scope.

A - You can't develop the technology without the architecture techniques. You can't have engineers developing the technology without close cooperation with the operators.

*Q - Concerning the intelligence structure. There is a lot of "copy and paste" from good intelligence analysts from NATO J2 staffs. There is a lot of duplication of effort. Is this the way we want to intelligence?*

*Q - From the audience - There is concern about the releasability issue concerning internet usage. Can we develop our own "Google" machine? How do we protect the intelligence internet structure?*

A - Intelligence in NATO is packaging of data. Intelligence is a national capability and NATO has treated it this way.

A - Intelligence was used to work this way until the NATO fusion centre was set up. There are analysts that have overcome this duplication of effort. It is concerned when organizations "cut and paste" their products, and do not add to the analysts. There is concern that this will increase in the near future.

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A - The reality of the web is coming. Aircraft will be able to act as servers in the sky. National assessment is a dual edged sword.

Statement from the audience – It is more and more important to look at HUMINT. We need the analysts with background information on culture. It is more and more important to look at knowledge development. EBAO is driving this concept.

A - We have seen EBAO. The concern is that EBAO is expensive in using a lot of people, pulling people together from different cuts.

Statement from the Moderator - Most nations are trying to put right the HUMINT issue and this is certainly a concern. ACT should be the champion of reorganizing the way intelligence has to be done.

*Q – HUMINT, we talk about nut and bolts of intelligence. In the comprehensive approach, military power is an instrument of the politicians. Are we receiving enough direction from the politicians?*

A - Most people at the lower levels do not see the HUMINT results. The construct is there and available, but the operators do not see this intelligence.

Statement from the Moderator – To my experience that mail only goes to senior commanders. The problem however, is at the lower level.